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Frankfurt cases. Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.
Jul 9, 2020 · 4. Objections to Frankfurt-Style Cases. Not everyone is impressed by Frankfurt’s proposed counterexamples and the FSCs he inspired. Some critics concede that PAP is false, but insist that some neighboring principle—one that will serve many of the same purposes as PAP—is immune to Frankfurt’s examples.
Nov 11, 2014 · Vihvelin’s claim that the difference between her view and the actual-sequence view is the difference between a metaphysical and a moral approach, and between a metaphysical and a moral form of compatibilism. 2. Vihvelin’s argument that Frankfurt-style cases are not a threat to the idea that responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise.
- Carolina Sartorio
- Sartorio@arizona.edu
- 2016
Jul 24, 2012 · Some Frankfurt-style cases—viz., those that eschew counterfactual intervention altogether—aren’t, obviously, implicated in this argument, but such cases are unacceptable on other grounds. Hunt (2000, 216–20), for example, describes three Frankfurt-style cases that don’t rely on the presence of a counterfactual controller. In his first ...
- Greg Janzen
- janzengreg@gmail.com
- 2013
blockage cases cannot avoid collapsing into the more traditional sort of Frankfurt-style case to which they are meant to be an alternative and so are vulnerable to the very same concerns they are meant to avoid. 2 The trouble with traditional Frankfurt-style cases A genuine counterexample to PAP will be a case in which an agent is morally
This sort of case—a Frankfurt-style case—appears to threaten PAP. Although PAP has traditionally been accepted by both compatibilists and incompatibilists about causal determinism and moral responsibility, the denial of PAP potentially opens up an interesting new route to compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility; that is, one might contend that causal determinism is ...
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Aug 22, 2013 · ‘Frankfurt-style cases’ (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy (J Philos 105:223–239, 2008) has recently argued that FSCs fail because we are not entitled to suppose that the agent is morally responsible, given ...
