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  1. Davidson also argues that to have a belief one must have the concept of belief, which involves the ability to recognize that beliefs can be false or that there is a mind-independent reality beyond one's beliefs; and one cannot have all that without language. However, Davidson offers little support for the claim that belief requires the concept of belief.

  2. Dec 12, 2015 · However, objective reality rely's heavily on independent verification by other sources. For example - I see a blue boat, and you agree that it is a also a blue boat in your perception, which implies the other sources are real and exist outside of our perception of them (a bit of a tautology).

  3. Relativism can take one of two forms: Subjectivism: the belief that each individual can and should come up with her own moral rules and live by them, and; Conventionalism: the belief that each culture or group should devise its own set of rules and standards that apply to that culture alone.

  4. Aug 19, 2003 · In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example adualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil – or God and the Devil – are independent and more or less equal forces in the world.

  5. Apr 21, 2021 · Although the answers to these issues are logically independent of each other, all of them are interconnected in this sense: providing an answer to each of them contributes to the general outlook on the metaphysical status of beliefs.

    • Krzysztof Poslajko
    • krzysztof.poslajko@uj.edu.pl
    • 2021
  6. So each person is made up of these two substances—matter and mind—that are entirely different in kind and can exist independently of each other. Talking of the mind in terms of substances gives rise to a number of problems (see Chapter 1).

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  8. Jun 1, 2006 · Group beliefs, or collective doxastic states, are states analogous to beliefs but attributed to groups instead of individuals. In this paper, existing views on the nature of certain types of group beliefs, non-summative group beliefs, are critically examined.