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1. economix.fr › doc › jpoOligopoly, Mutual Dependence and Tacit Collusion: The ...

   economix.fr › doc › jpo

   The idea of tacit collusion in oligopoly hinged on the assumption that firms had some “recognition of their mutual dependence” (Chamberlin 1933, 46-7). Thus, competition

2. cuts-ccier.org › pdf › Article-Corruption_in_marketCorruption in market competition: collusion and cartels

   cuts-ccier.org › pdf › Article-Corruption_in_market

   Cartels and other collusion schemes can gain enormous anticompetitive rents that wreak havoc on consumers and the world economy. No product or service is immune. Price-fixing and collusion schemes have been found to penetrate markets from food and vitamins to the most arcane chemical compounds, from industrial inputs and

3. www.sciencedirect.com › science › articleChapter 8 The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for ...

   www.sciencedirect.com › science › article

   Jan 1, 2007 · The present chapter focuses on the economic analysis of the impact of mergers on collusion and its consequences for anti-trust policy. 3 The legal treatment of collusion depends on the form it takes: explicit, tacit, or any combination of the two.

4. academic.oup.com › edited-volume › 34484Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental ...

   academic.oup.com › edited-volume › 34484

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   This chapter provides a selective review of economic theory and experimental evidence on cartels and collusion. In particular, it highlights the role of incentives in collusion and cartel formation and identifies conditions that are conducive to collusive behavior.

5. www.nber.org › working_papers › w28299MARKET STRUCTURE AND EXTORTION: EVIDENCE FROM 50,000 ...

   www.nber.org › working_papers › w28299

   pact between gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the pact led to a large reduction in competition and violence, we find that it increased the amount paid in extortion by approximately 20%. Much of this increase was passed

6. www.tandfonline.com › doi › fullOligopoly, mutual dependence and tacit collusion: the ...

   www.tandfonline.com › doi › full

   Jun 14, 2021 · First, the possibility of tacit collusion in oligopoly allowed them to provide theoretical grounds for explaining price rigidities. Second, the oligopoly issue fostered the development of new tools for identifying oligopolies and accounting for firms’ behaviour and strategic interaction.

7. People also ask

   How does collusion affect Cartel pricing?

   • Numerical solutions of the cartel’s optimal pricing problem show that there is a transitory and a stationary cartel phase. In the stationary cartel phase, collusion reduces the price variance generated by the underlying cost shocks. See chapter 18 in this volume by Levenstein and Suslow for empirical evidence on cartels and collusion.

   Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental Economics

   academic.oup.com/edited-volume/34484/chapter/292564656

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   How do market characteristics affect the likelihood of collusion?

   • Most often, a given market will have some characteristics that facilitate collusion, and some that tend to hinder collusion. Predicting on this basis alone the likelihood of collusion can thus be complex. In addition, the same market situation can give rise to different equilibria.

   Chapter 8 The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger

   www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0573855506820080

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   How does collusion affect a firm's profitability?

   • The profitability of collusion can in turn influence the firms' willingness to design and implement practices that facilitate the implementation of a collusive action. It can also induce firms to engage in more explicit collusion, at the risk of being caught by antitrust enforcement.

   Chapter 8 The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger

   www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0573855506820080

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   Why is collusion more difficult to sustain?

   • For a fixed number of market participants, collusion is easier to sustain in growing markets, where today's profits are small compared with tomorrow's ones. Conversely, collusion is more difficult to sustain in declining markets, where tomorrow's profits (with or without retaliation) will be small anyway.

   Chapter 8 The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger

   www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0573855506820080

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   Does market growth lead to collusion?

   • In markets with low entry barriers, market growth is indeed likely to generate entry, and the overall impact may well be detrimental to collusion. However, in those markets where entry barriers are high (e.g., because of needed patents), the intrinsic impact of market growth may prevail and facilitate collusion.

   Chapter 8 The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger

   www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0573855506820080

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   How does a merger affect a firm's ability to sustain tacit collusion?

   • First, some factors that may or may not be affected by the merger have a decisive impact on the firms' ability to sustain tacit collusion. These factors include entry barriers, the frequency of interaction and the role of innovation.

   Chapter 8 The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger

   www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0573855506820080

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8. link.springer.com › referenceworkentry › 10Cartels and Collusion - SpringerLink

   link.springer.com › referenceworkentry › 10

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   Jan 1, 2019 · This entry provides an introductory account of cartels and collusion and the means used by European and American law to control such practices. The welfare-reducing and welfare-enhancing features of these cartel and other cartel-type arrangements are discussed to...