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1. plato.stanford.edu › entries › free-riderThe Free Rider Problem - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu › entries › free-rider

   May 21, 2003 · Social psychology asks: To what extent and in what circumstances are people motivated to free ride? and What sorts of negative incentives are effective in motivating cooperation when free riding is possible?

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2. www.academia.edu › 6456659 › Cycles_of_cooperationCycles of cooperation and free-riding in social systems

   www.academia.edu › 6456659 › Cycles_of_cooperation

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   Basic evidences on non-profit making and other forms of benevolent-based organizations reveal a rough partition of members between some pure consumers of the public good (free-riders) and benevolent individuals (cooperators).

3. www.researchgate.net › publication › 23779013_CyclesCycles of cooperation and free-riding in social systems

   www.researchgate.net › publication › 23779013_Cycles

   Feb 2, 2009 · We study the relationship between the community size and the level of cooperation in a simple model where the utility of joining the community is proportional to its size.

4. core.ac.uk › download › pdfCycles of cooperation and free-riding in social systems - CORE

   core.ac.uk › download › pdf

   ganizations reveal a rough partition of members between some pure consumers of the public good (free-riders) and benevolent individuals (cooperators). We study the relationship between the community size and the level of cooperation in a sim-ple model where the utility of joining the community is proportional to its size.

5. academic.oup.com › pq › articleFairness, Individuality, and Free Riding | The Philosophical ...

   academic.oup.com › pq › article

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   Jan 7, 2022 · According to most contemporary theorists, free riding on the cooperative contributions of others is unfair. At the same time, obligations to contribute to cooperative schemes can compel conformity with conventional practices, and can do so to a degree that poses a real threat to individuality.

6. www.jstor.org › stable › 26155208FREE-RIDING IN MULTI-PARTY ALLIANCES: THE ROLE OF ... - JSTOR

   www.jstor.org › stable › 26155208

   We shed light on this issue by analyzing the relationship between partners' free-riding—defined as their effort-withholding—and their perceptions of alliance effectiveness and peers' collaboration.

7. People also ask

   Are people free riding?

   • The facts that there is a lot of collective action even in many large-number contexts in which the individuals do not have rich relationships with each other and that, therefore, many people are not free riding in relevant contexts suggest at least three possibilities.

   The Free Rider Problem - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/

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   Is free riding purely self-interested?

   • But when the group is very large, free riding is often clearly in the interest of most and perhaps all members. Against the assumption of purely self-interested behavior, we know that there are many active, more or less well funded groups that seek collective results that serve interests other than those of their own members.

   The Free Rider Problem - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/

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   Is free riding morally wrong?

   • It is also widely held that there are circumstances in which free riding on the provision of a collective good is morally wrong, because unfair. The two most prominent attempts to describe the conditions under which this kind of wrongness occurs are H.L.A. Hart’s principle of “mutuality of restrictions”:

   The Free Rider Problem - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/

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   Can state policy block free riding?

   • Suppose you and I both want cleaner air but that each of us would free ride on the efforts of others to clean the air. State policy can block free riding, if necessary at metaphorical gunpoint. We both prefer the general effort to provide cleaner air and we both pay our share toward the cost of providing it. 4. Explaining Collective Action

   The Free Rider Problem - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/

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   Do we have incentive to free ride?

   • Therefore I and possibly every one of us have incentive not to contribute and to free ride on the contributions of others. If we all attempt to free ride, however, there is no provision and no ‘ride.’ The scope for free riding can be enormous. Suppose our large group would benefit from providing ourselves some good at cost to each of us.

   The Free Rider Problem - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/

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   What is the free rider problem?

   • The free rider problem is that the efficient production of important collective goods by free agents is jeopardized by the incentive each agent has not to pay for it: if the supply of the good is inadequate, one’s own action of paying will not make it adequate; if the supply is adequate, one can receive it without paying.

   The Free Rider Problem - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/

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8. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › articles › PMC3365621The Psychosemantics of Free Riding: Dissecting the ...

   pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › articles › PMC3365621

   The presence of individuals with a disposition to free ride—that is, to take the benefits of group cooperation without contributing to the cooperative project— can jeopardize the evolution of collective action.