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  1. Nov 5, 2023 · In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of “conceptual ethics” approach to thinking about legal interpretation, which is less tethered to existing legal practice (or the existing meaning of core pieces of legal terminology).

  2. What kinds of reasons should matter in choosing an approach to constitutional or legal interpretation? Scholars offer different types of reasons for their theories of interpretation: conceptual, linguistic, normative, legal, institutional, and reasons based on theories of law.

  3. Nov 5, 2023 · In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of “conceptual ethics” approach to thinking about legal interpretation, which is less tethered to existing legal practice (or the existing meaning...

    • David Plunkett
  4. Jul 7, 2021 · Conceptual arguments claim that a particular approach to legal interpretation follows from the concept of interpretation, the concept of law, the concept of authority, or some other relevant concept (e.g., Neale 2012 [Other Internet Resources]; see Berman 2009, 37–68).

  5. Feb 10, 2017 · We argue that legal interpretive rules are conceptually possible, normatively sensible, and actually part of our legal system. This Article thus reframes the theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation, distinguishing purely linguistic questions from legal questions to which language offers no unique answer.

  6. Sep 2, 2021 · In this paper, I want to challenge some of Raz’s theses on legal reasoning, with his theory of law as background. Raz argues that legal interpretation and judicial adjudication are both fundamentally open to moral argument, where the voice of the legitimate legal authority is just a first voice.

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  8. This is an issue in what I call “conceptual ethics.” This argument in conceptual ethics can be well worth having, given the connotations that the term “law” plays in many contexts, ranging from legal argument to political philosophy to social-scientific inquiry.