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  1. Theories of legal interpretation do not, however, purport to offer guidance on other issues, such as how to make discretionary decisions not controlled by legal standards or whether to follow the law. The most important arguments in favor of this understanding of legal interpretation are the main arguments against the linguistic-meaning and ...

  2. The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1235, 1238–39 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon, Meaning of Legal Meaning] (addressing interpretive choice in terms of a choice of legal meaning); Mark Greenberg, Legal Interpretation and Natural Law, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 109, 109–10 ...

  3. Introduction. William Baude and Stephen Sachs argue for the importance of the “law of interpretation” — legal standards that govern how statutes, constitutional provisions, and other legal materials are to be interpreted. 1 Their article begins by following and developing a cluster of arguments I have elaborated in recent work — arguments that emphasize the importance of distinguishing ...

  4. Feb 10, 2017 · Like other parts of the law, what we call “the law of interpretation” has a claim to guide the actions of judges, officials, and private interpreters — even if it isn’t ideal. We argue that legal interpretive rules are conceptually possible, normatively sensible, and actually part of our legal system. This Article thus reframes the ...

  5. Theory, roughly speaking, legal interpretation requires ascertaining the moral consequences of. the ratification of constitutions, enactment of statutes, and other actions of legal institutions.32. Finally, on the widespread implicit picture of law according to which the content of the law is.

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  6. Jul 3, 2018 · By examining the role of interpretative arguments in legal interpretation, we argue that there is a tension between this commitment and the doctrine of the rule of recognition (Hart 1961). In light of this, we argue that Hartian positivism is only compatible with a weakened or “minimal” version of the theory.

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  8. As shown in the previous chapters, interpretation is at the crossroad between linguistics – and in particular pragmatics – and legal theory. When we analyzed the relationship between the Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatic frameworks and the instruments used in legal interpretation, we pointed out the role of presumptions and defeasibility in assessing the strength of an interpretation.