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The counter-majoritarian difficulty (sometimes counter-majoritarian dilemma) is a perceived problem with judicial review of legislative (or popularly-created) laws.
Jul 20, 2015 · An institutional arrangement that gives judges the faculty to strike down laws inconsistent with the constitution only creates a counter-majoritarian difficulty if the constitution cannot be amended by simple majorities.
The “countermajoritarian difficulty,” first formulated by Alexander Bickel almost fifty years ago, has been a profoundly influential starting point for those who critically examine the relationship between democracy and constitutional judicial review.
- Scott E Lemieux, David J Watkins
- 2009
Sep 9, 2012 · The counter-majoritarian difficulty may be the best known problem in constitutional theory. The phrase is attributed to Alexander Bickel—a Yale Law School Professor—who is said to have introduced it in his famous book The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics .
The apparent tension between judicial review and the democratic process—what Alexander Bickel dubbed the “countermajoritarian difficulty”—has been the focal point of modern constitutional scholarship.
Jan 7, 2013 · The American Supreme Court’s most prominent normative difficulty, the countermajoritarian (CM) difficulty, captures two fundamental aspects of democratic government: majoritarianism and electoral accountability. 1 The majoritarianism aspect presents the difficulty of an unelected Court that rules in a specific controversy against the current ...
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posed counter-majoritarian difficulty has largely blinded critics to the real, and exactly opposite danger—that the Supreme Court is insuffi-ciently counter-majoritarian to protect minority rights when they are really threatened.8 This Article examines the implications of the substantial role that