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- Contemporary metaethics often dates its emergence as a distinct subfield of moral philosophy to the publication of G. E. Moore ’s Principia Ethica in 1903, although many Moorean lines of argument can be found in Henry Sidgwick’ s earlier Methods of Ethics (1874).
www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/metaethics/v-1/sections/history-12186
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Jan 26, 2005 · In metaethics his non-naturalism likewise remained dominant for several decades, though here Moore played a larger role, especially for later generations, because of the vigor with which he presented the view.
Jan 23, 2007 · Coming at the same issues from a different direction, G. E. Moore argued (at the beginning of the twentieth century) that no naturalist account of morality could do justice to what we are actually thinking and claiming when we make moral judgments.
Contemporary metaethics often dates its emergence as a distinct subfield of moral philosophy to the publication of G. E. Moore ’s Principia Ethica in 1903, although many Moorean lines of argument can be found in Henry Sidgwick’ s earlier Methods of Ethics (1874).
Mar 10, 2021 · G. E. Moore was a supporter of Cognitivism and Realism. However, Moore was not a naturalist — he was a non-naturalist — and objected to the idea that moral properties were natural properties. Moore’s objection to identifying moral properties as natural properties was two-fold.
Jun 30, 2010 · Moore’s Principia Ethica, on the other hand, continues to stand solidly behind most of the interesting and original work in metaethics today. This collection is some of the best most recent evidence of Moore’s continuing and central role in the history of philosophy.
- Consuelo Preti
- preti@tcnj.edu
- 2010
But when it comes to theory of the good, the irreducible core of normative ethical theory according to Moore, metaethics can play no more than a destructive role, showing only how attempts to ground intrinsic value claims in putative analyses, or indeed, to give any justificatory reasons for intrinsic value claims at all, must always come to grief.
Moore’s discussion emphasized the distinction between two kinds of ques-tions about morality, which in turn encouraged the development of indepen-dent research programs in what would later be called “metaethics” and “nor-mative ethics”.
