Yahoo Canada Web Search

Search results

  1. Apr 1, 2024 · This paper investigates moral hazard from bank bailouts and its welfare implications. The traditional channel of moral hazard in existing literature arises from banks offering excessively attractive deposit contracts that lead to inefficiently large bailouts when there is a run. This paper introduces a new, second channel of moral hazard ...

    • Bank Bailouts

      Among the few formal models of bank bailouts in the...

  2. bailouts exacerbate moral hazard. In the model, a bank makes an endogenous choice of the risks of its investments and can nance these investments by deposits and risky debt. I estimate nine model parameters that characterize a bank’s behavior. For the full sample of U.S. banks, I estimate the expected bailout probability, conditional on ...

    • 406KB
    • 51
  3. nets also can create moral hazard in the form of excessive risk-taking behavior. We develop a structural model to estimate empirically the extent to which bank bailouts create moral hazard. The main challenge faced by any empirical test of this moral hazard hypothesis is an identification problem. Bailed-out banks are, by definition,

  4. Mar 15, 2023 · March 15, 2023. Bailouts create a moral hazard even if they are justified. Is there another way? By Hung Tran. Even with today’s economic unpredictability, there is one certainty you can take to the bank: When banks fail, talk of bailouts will follow. It happened during the 2008 financial crisis.

  5. Oct 1, 2003 · Among the few formal models of bank bailouts in the literature, 4 perhaps the one that more explicitly represents the standard social cost-moral hazard trade-off is Goodhart and Huang (1999). They show that the central bank has incentives to provide LOLR assistance inasmuch as concerns about bank contagion are weighted more strongly than moral hazard considerations.

    • Tito Cordella, Eduardo Levy Yeyati
    • 2003
  6. Mar 14, 2023 · Law School professor who served as Fed regulator talks moral hazard, implications for inflation after SVB collapse rocks Washington and Wall Street In recent days, federal regulators have taken dramatic steps to stabilize financial markets, protect depositors from ruin, and prevent more bank failures following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and a handful of other small, tech-focused ...

  7. People also ask

  8. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.2% to 9.9%. Only interventions directly targeting bank management and, to a lesser extent, penalties mitigate moral hazard. Weak interventions, such as warnings, do not reduce moral hazard.

  1. People also search for