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Aug 27, 2020 · Therefore, bank insiders such as the chief executive and chief financial officers, or the chairman of the board contribute to the standard agency problem when acting on behalf of shareholders, but also when acting in their own interests and, in this case, against the interests of shareholders, bondholders, and taxpayers.
This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders (e.g., executives). We first check that these loans are a form of private benefit.
Nov 17, 2020 · Therefore, bank insiders such as the CEO, CFO or Chairman of the Board contribute to the standard agency problem not only when acting on behalf of shareholders but also when acting in their own interests and, in this case, against the interests of shareholders, bondholders and taxpayers. 1 Agency problems are at the heart of modern corporate finance theories (Myers, 1977; Tirole, 2006), but ...
- Ozlem Akin, José María Marín, José-Luis Peydró
- 2020
Cooley, Richardson, and Walter, 2010). Therefore, bank insiders such as CEO, CFO or Chairman of the board contribute to the standard agency problem when acting on behalf of shareholders, but also when acting on their own interest and, in this case, against the interests of shareholders, bondholders and taxpayers.1 Note
- Ozlem Akin, José María Marín, José-Luis Peydró
- 2020
consumption of private benefits by bank insiders and, thereby, the agency problems within banks. Using U.S. bank-level data, we measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders e.g., executive officers, directors and principal shareholders. We first check that these
Sep 17, 2021 · This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders (e.g., executives). We first check that these loans are a form of private benefit. By exploiting interstate branching deregulation, we then show that banks react to greater competition ...
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May 27, 2021 · Abstract. This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the ...
