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Mar 19, 2015 · Immoralism therefore seems to be defensible only from the viewpoint of a morality, which makes it appear to be as self-refuting as another notorious Nietzschean claim, that truths are illusions.
- Dedication
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of...
- Abbreviations
Nietzsche’s works are cited using the following...
- Introduction
Foot interprets Nietzsche’s immoralism as a rejection of a...
- Bibliography
Abstract. This chapter explores Nietzsche’s influence on the...
- Nietzsche on Free Will, Causality, and Responsibility
Abstract. This chapter presents an account of Nietzsche's...
- Nietzsche as Anti-metaphysician
Abstract. This chapter explores Nietzsche’s works during his...
- Co-Authored With David Dudrick
Leiter takes Nietzsche to object to a version of morality he...
- Nietzsche's Antidemocratic Rhetoric
Abstract. This chapter challenges the consensus that has...
- Dedication
In short, an immoral action e.g. murder doesn't switch its moral valence from bad (negative) to good (positive) just because a net good is the result. The same goes for a moral action, it doesn't change sign from positive to negative even if there's a net bad.
Immoralism allows individuals to act according to their own desires and interests, without being constrained by external moral codes. In contrast, moralism holds individuals accountable to universal moral truths that dictate what is right and wrong.
By examining the central thesis of Nietzsche's immoralism and elucidating many of his key ideas, e.g. ‘the will to power’, ‘master–slave morality’ and the ‘overman’ (superman), Foot argues that although Nietzsche's immoralism should be given serious consideration, the emphatic conclusion is that, in the last analysis, no part of ...
Immoralism therefore seems to be defensible only from the viewpoint of a morality, which makes it appear to be as self-refuting as another notorious Nietzschean claim, that truths are illusions. 10 We dealt with the latter of these two apparently problematic views in chapter 2 .
Kieran’s defense of cognitive immoralism rests on the claim that artworks adopting immoral perspectives may enhance our moral understanding, and Gaut’s cognitive argument for ethicism relies on a similar assumption.
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Kieran’s defense of cognitive immoralism rests on the claim that artworks adopting immoral perspectives may enhance our moral understanding, and Gaut’s cognitive argument for ethicism relies on a similar assumption.
