Ad
related to: What are conceptual arguments for legal interpretation?We Are Certified Interpretation Professionals In 200+ Languages. Contact Us For a Quote. We Offer Video Remote, Phone & On-Site Interpreting. Contact Us For A Quote Now
- Get A Quick Quote Now
Interpreting, Translations & more
Let us know how we can help you
- Who We Are
Helping you communicate effectively
with others around the globe
- Get A Quick Quote Now
Search results
- There is no shortage of theories of legal inter-pretation, with their corresponding favored methods for reading statutes or the Constitution: in statutory interpretation, pragmatism, textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism; and in constitutional interpretation, originalism in its many variants, moral readings, common law con-stitutionalism, and common good constitutionalism, just to name a few.
columbialawreview.org/content/reasons-for-interpretation/
People also ask
What are conceptual arguments for legal interpretation?
How do you argue for a theory of legal interpretation?
What are the main arguments in favor of legal interpretation?
What is the difference between legal interpretation and linguistic interpretation?
What is a theory of legal interpretation?
Does legal interpretation seek the content of the law?
Jul 7, 2021 · Conceptual arguments claim that a particular approach to legal interpretation follows from the concept of interpretation, the concept of law, the concept of authority, or some other relevant concept (e.g., Neale 2012 [Other Internet Resources]; see Berman 2009, 37–68).
May 29, 2001 · 1. What Do Legal Theorists Mean By ‘Legal Reasoning’? 2. The Role of Interpretation in Legal Reasoning: 2.1 Some Intellectual Roots Considered. 2.2 An Initial View of the Nature of Interpretation: Conservation and Creativity. 2.3 Locating Interpretation in Legal Reasoning. 2.4 Some Points of Disagreement.
Nov 5, 2023 · The approach I explore asks questions about legal interpretation in a way that is tethered to what legal (or “legal-ish”) concepts people should deploy, as part of arguments on behalf of engaging in legal (or “legal-ish”) practices different from our current ones.
Jun 14, 2019 · Legal science, on a narrower reading, examines the law qua object of legal cognition. Substituting legal cognition for traditional legal interpretation, Kelsen claims that legal cognition is constitutive of its object, a claim that requires a neo-Kantian transcendental argument for support.
- Stanley L. Paulson
- 2019
Sep 2, 2021 · In this paper, I want to challenge some of Raz’s theses on legal reasoning, with his theory of law as background. Raz argues that legal interpretation and judicial adjudication are both fundamentally open to moral argument, where the voice of the legitimate legal authority is just a first voice.
The categories of interpretative argument are, first, those that appeal to the linguistic context itself as a source of reasons for favouring one interpretation or another (‘linguistic’ arguments); secondly, those that look at the legal system as the special context of the authoritative text to see how best to make sense of it in that ...