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Aug 20, 2002 · Personal identity deals with philosophical questions that arise about ourselves by virtue of our being people (or as lawyers and philosophers like to say, persons). This contrasts with questions about ourselves that arise by virtue of our being living things, conscious beings, moral agents, or material objects.
Dec 15, 2004 · Identity. Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time, but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have also attracted attention.
Dec 20, 2005 · Contemporary Accounts of Personal Identity. There are four general accounts of personal identity that have been taken to have some relevance to ethics by contemporary theorists: psychological, biological, narrative, and a new one to be labeled “anthropological.”.
Feb 11, 2019 · This entry aims to first get clear on the basics of Locke’s position, when it comes to persons and personal identity, before turning to areas of the text that continue to be debated by historians of philosophy working to make sense of Locke’s picture of persons today.
Aug 20, 2002 · Personal Identity. Personal identity deals with questions that arise about ourselves by virtue of our being people (or, as lawyers and philosophers like to say, persons).
Mar 18, 2005 · Personal identity is perhaps the most extensively discussed special case of identity. What is it for a person existing at one time to be identical to a person existing at another? This question was first clearly posed by John Locke in his celebrated discussion of personal identity in the Essay (Locke 1975).
Mar 18, 2009 · Indeed, Reid holds that it is impossible to account for personal identity in any terms other than itself. Personal identity is simple and unanalyzable. Though memory is not the metaphysical ground of personal identity, according to Reid, it provides first-personal evidence of personal identity.
Jan 12, 2000 · The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain.
Locke's account of personal identity turned out to be revolutionary. His account of personal identity is embedded in a general account of identity. In this general account of identity Locke distinguishes between the identity of atoms, masses of atoms and living things.
Most philosophers seem inclin’d to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect.
