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What is the role of legal interpretation in the case of vagueness?
Is vagueness a feature of law?
What is vagueness doctrine?
Why is vagueness a snare for legal theory?
What is the void for vagueness doctrine?
Does vagueness lead to indeterminacies?
The void for vagueness doctrine requires that laws are so written that they explicitly and definitely state what conduct is punishable. The doctrine thus serves two purposes. First, all persons receive a fair notice of what is punishable and what is not.
Aug 10, 2023 · A law that defines a crime in vague terms is likely to raise due-process issues. Courts in the United States give particular scrutiny to vague laws relative to First Amendment issues because of their possible chilling effect on protected rights.
The vagueness doctrine is a Constitutional requirement criminal laws must explicitly state and define what conduct is prohibited and punishable. Under the vagueness doctrine, a criminal law cannot be too obscure for the average American citizen to understand and follow.
Oct 26, 2009 · It is widely accepted that vagueness in law calls for a specific interpretation of the law—interpretation that changes the meaning of the law and makes it more precise. According to this view, vagueness causes gaps in the law, and the role of legal interpretation in the case of vagueness is to fill such gaps. I argue that this view is ...
- Ólafur Páll Jónsson
- 2009
Dec 14, 2000 · Vagueness leads to indeterminacies in the application of the law in many cases. This book responds to the challenges that those indeterminacies pose to a theory of law and adjudication.
Vagueness of language is commonly supposed to pose problems for the law insofar as it is a source of indeterminacy, and indeterminacy results in borderline or ‘hard’ cases. This chapter argues that in legal cases where soritical vagueness (the vagueness associated with borderline cases) occurs, specifically where the court appears obliged ...
Apr 23, 2019 · I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks.
