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One reason why we misidentify the moral valence of an immoral act like murder is because it occasionally produces net good like in the example above, but a moment's reflection reveals that murder has actually reduced the net good (from +5 to +4).
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Mar 1, 2014 · Moral disengagement theory predicts that immoral behavior will be high when an individual knows that the act is immoral but has the propensity to morally disengage from such beliefs. Second, we examined the interaction between implicit knowledge of the immorality of an act and moral disengagement using this same logic.
- Scott J. Reynolds, Carolyn T. Dang, Kai Chi Yam, Keith Leavitt
- 2014
Jun 21, 2022 · If the same action can be moral and immoral in different ethical frameworks (e.g. consequentialism, virtue ethics), how can we judge if the action is moral or not? A person will either be sufficiently persuaded by a framework (and/or by the solution to which the framework leads), or they will remain undecided and fall into a moral dilemma/trilemma (etc) as a result of being unable to resolve ...
Feb 23, 2004 · To act out of respect for the moral law, in Kant’s view, is to be moved to act by a recognition that the moral law is a supremely authoritative standard that binds us and to experience a kind of feeling, which is akin to awe and fear, when we acknowledge the moral law as the source of moral requirements.
- Robert Johnson, Adam Cureton
- 2004
Jul 13, 2021 · Existing moral identity scales measure good/moral vs. bad/immoral, but the Theory of Dyadic Morality highlights two-dimensions of morality: valence (good/moral vs. bad/immoral) and agency (high ...
Jan 18, 2019 · In addition, we include questions addressing the stated willingness to display moral or immoral behavior (e.g., lie, cheat, help others, donate money or blood), which is also used to indicate the occurrence of moral justifications or moral disengagement to maintain a moral self-view.
Studies 4 and 5 further show that a neutral action such as hitting the bull’s-eye is more difficult than killing and that difficult actions are less often judged inten-tional. When difficulty is held constant, people’s intentionality judgments are fully respon-sive to skill information regardless of moral valence.
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Why do we misidentify the moral valence of an immoral act?
How does knowledge of immorality affect moral disengagement?
Does moral disengagement theory predict immoral behavior?
Does knowledge of immorality inhibit immoral behavior?
Does a moral action change Valence from negative to positive?
Is 'immoral behavior' morally appropriate?
