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- That is, he rejected the notion that science relates to what is generally or universally true—and is therefore always ‘live’—while history relates only to particular events in the past and is therefore ‘dead’. 3 Collingwood's point was that both kinds of knowledge arise from active and systematic enquiry in the present, and therefore both deserve to be regarded as ‘scientific’.
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191659906000787
Jan 11, 2006 · Collingwood calls this kind of history scissors-and-paste history and condemns it as a pseudo history. Genuine history seeks to recover the meaning behind the statements, not whether they are true or false (Haddock 1995).
- Peirce’s Theory of Hypothetical Inference
- Collingwood and Hypothetical Inference: The Example of The Celtic Revival
- Peirce’s Theory of Inquiry
The starting point of Peirce’s theory of abduction is the question whether there is a logic of scientific discovery. This question has become well-known, of course, because of Karl Popper’s book The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Though Popper highly valued Peirce and even called him ‘one of the greatest philosophers of all time’,Footnote 7 his app...
It is remarkable indeed how much Peirce’s notion of a hypothetical inference corresponds to the way Collingwood describes certain procedures of historical reasoning in his An Autobiography. An example is his discussion of the issue of the ‘Celtic Revival’, involving the question that after the Roman conquest the Celtic fashions had been replaced by...
With regard to Peirce, it should be noted that later in his life he changed the syllogistic form in which he initially put forward his theory of hypothetical inference into a theory in which deduction, induction and hypothesis were not conceived as being separate, but as three stages in a scientific inquiry.Footnote 20In this connection he used, ho...
- Jan van der Dussen
- 2016
Since its appearance in 1981 History as a Science has been welcomed as a coherent and comprehensive review and analysis of the many aspects of Collingwood’s philosophy of history, the development of his views, and their reception.
Accordingly, Collingwood in Speculum Mentis maintains that science is the assertion of the abstract concept. It regards the facts merely as particulars and it seeks to separate the universal from the particulars and to study it in isolation. It is abstract thinking; but to abstract is 'to consider separately things that are in-
Since its appearance in 1981, History as a Science by Jan van der Dussen has been welcomed as a coherent and comprehensive study of the many aspects of Collingwood’s philosophy of history, including its development and reception. The book was the first to pay attention to Collingwood’s unpublished manuscripts, and to his work as an ...
- Jan Van Der Dussen
- May 11, 2020
Sep 1, 2007 · R.G. Collingwood defined historical knowledge as essentially ‘scientific’, and saw the historian's task as the ‘re-enactment of past thoughts’.
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Mar 4, 1999 · A central motif of R. G. Collingwood's philosophy of history is the idea that historical understanding requires a re-enactment of past experience. However, there have been sharp disagreements about the acceptability of this idea, and even its meaning.
